“我谨希望各位，能够为了保卫养育我们的祖国，迦太基的光辉以及大家深爱的女人，将仅有的一点勇气，投入到明天的残酷战斗中去。是的，我们也许会输------你，我，他，可能会独自死去，但一定会有人活着离开战场。很多年后，人们在谈到今天的我们时会赞美迦太基的第二次复苏。同样，人们也会为我们的明天落泪，为迦太基感慨。不过我更相信人们望着那片沙地，他们高歌他们欢笑，他们会说：‘看哪，那个俊美的小子回来了，满载着战利品、罗马人的鲜血，还有一个真正军人的荣耀！’” 

--汉尼拔于扎马决战前夕。(http://post.baidu.com/f?z=166104074&ct=335544320&lm=0&sc=0&rn=50&tn=baiduPostBrowser&word=%C0%FA%CA%B7%D1%D0%BE%BF&pn=0,可靠性待考)

"也许仅就取得的功绩与战役的规模而言，比他强者有很多，但是，当亚历山大征服波斯的时候，他的身后，是整个希腊世界；当恺撒征服高卢的时候，他的身后，是强大的罗马；当白起横扫六国之军时，他的身后，是国力雄厚的秦；当霍去病封狼居胥时，他的身后，是达到鼎盛的汉。而在汉尼拔远征意大利的时候，他的身后是什么？是一个目光短浅、嫉贤妒能的国家，是看着汉尼拔孤军奋战却不肯给予援军的迦太基元老院。在这样的背景下，带着一群不会说本国语言的士兵，操着各式各样的武器，穿着五花八门的盔甲，在没有后方的情况下，与强大的罗马血战16年未尝一败，这样的壮举，却只有汉尼拔做到了！"(  http://post.baidu.com/f?z=166104074&ct=335544320&lm=0&sc=0&rn=50&tn=baiduPostBrowser&word=%C0%FA%CA%B7%D1%D0%BE%BF&pn=0)

  今天看了一下汉尼拔的事迹。他很强，在第一次布匿战争后制海权已被罗马掌握的情况下，凭着一颗报复罗马的仇恨和信念带领40000余士兵攀过比利牛斯山脉，攀过阿尔卑斯山，攻到罗马城下。 16年几乎战无不胜.

  他的失败，最直接的原因：１，孤军深入无援，他弟进军援助他路中被全军歼灭。２，费边的拖延战术成功牵制了他的进攻。　3,西辟阿不与汉尼拔正面交锋，而转而进攻迦太基本土，导致汉尼拔被召回本土防卫。

  在后来保卫迦太基的轧马会战中遭惨败，迦太基被迫签订不平等条约，赔偿巨款、销毁几乎所有战舰。汉尼拔逃亡，最终服毒自杀。５０年后，罗马发动第三次布匿战争，摧毁迦太基城，将所有幸存居民卖为奴隶。

  汉尼拔是个悲剧英雄，率军攀越阿尔卑斯山进攻罗马腹地，不可为而为之，为了自己许下的诺言，不顾一切地进攻，从审美上我很喜欢，这样的人历史上很多，比如拜占庭的朱里安皇帝，一心要在基督教的国度恢复希腊异教……常使文人垂泣凭吊。

  后来跟我哥讨论起他，他一语道破，迦太基的毁灭不是战术上的，而是战略上的。为了仇恨深入敌境，只为了对罗马造成尽可能大的伤害，却没有明确的、现实的和分步骤的战略目的，整个迦太基十几年像无头苍蝇一样不知道自己在干什么，这是导致失败的根本。从这个意义上讲，汉尼拔也许是迦太基的罪人。后来又联想起了拿破仑进攻俄罗斯，战术上一路成功，打入圣彼得堡（其实是别人故意让给他的），却没什么战略意义。

  其实具体的史实我并不十分了解。我只是喜欢汉尼拔这个人。他多半也是个白羊座，Ｏ型血。喝多啦，东拼西凑地瞎写写。

   突然又想起三国演义里面最让人心酸的一句话：孔明“得其主而不得其时”。可失败到底是人引起的还是时造成的？

  We shall surpass the Alps, plunder the heartland of Rome, even the consequence is humiliation and death!

补充(20080116)：最近在读Von Clausewitz的On War, 颇受启发，在此列出几条重要观点，对照上述仁兄的光荣事迹思考之。

1. War is never an isolated act. War does not consist of a single instantaneous blow. The Result in war is never absolute.

2. The War of a community – of whole Nations, and particularly of civilised Nations – always starts from a political condition, and is called forth by a political motive… War in the real world, as we have already seen, is not an extreme thing which expends itself at one single discharge… (Rather) to be subject to the will of a guiding intelligence. If we reflect that War has its root in a political object, then naturally this original motive which called it into existence should also continue the first and highest consideration in its conduct.

3. Policy, therefore, is interwoven with the whole action of War, and must exercise a continuous influence upon it, as far as the nature of the forces liberated by it will permit.  

4. War is a mere continuation of policy by other means (viz. Violence).

5. War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means. All beyond this which is strictly peculiar to War relates merely to the peculiar nature of the means which it uses. That the tendencies and views of policy shall not be incompatible with these means, the Art of War in general and the Commander in each particular case may demand, and this claim is truly not a trifling one. But however powerfully this may react on political views in particular cases, still it must always be regarded as only a modification of them; for the political view is the object, War is the means, and the means must always include the object in our conception. (All above quoted from Clausewitz,  On War, content in brackets added by myself.)

  ‘Violence arms itself with inventions of Arts and Science in order to contend violence’, the above mentioned commanders mastered these arts and science to the extent that close to the state of art. However, War does not proceed in vacuum.  It happens in specific situation and circumstances. It is politics by other means. It is one of the instruments of state policy, in the meantime, all the elements in your state could be used as instruments of war. Therefore a smart general should not neglect the political objective of the war which his activity in the battle ground should serve and push the war into extreme merely because of his personal emotion. The war serves the policy rather than the policy serves the war (as long as the policies are not incompatible with the conduct of the war which is rightly implemented in order to achieve the state policy).

  In the case of Hannibal, before his expedition, he should have thought about that, was it possible for Carthage to totally destroy Rome? By every account, it was impossible (the political constitutions, the economic situations, the military systems, the individual capability of their soldiers and commanders, the general strategic situation before the war, etc. Generally speaking, the war potential of both nations was asymmetric.) Understanding that it was impossible to destroy Rome, was it clever still to set the destruction of Rome as the objective? Was it clever still to initiate his expedition which would lose many of his soldiers even before the battle was start and without definite prospect of sufficient reinforcements from his homeland? Was it clever to continue his fighting after several splendid victories until the situation deteriorated instead of finding a favourable diplomatic settlement and wait for better opportunities in the future? 

The sting pierces a dead heart used to be the tongue of the sweetest kiss;

The ash with unbearable lightness is the corpse of the brightest fire;

The coldest abyss is the finale of the most intense explosion.

  I don't want this endless shaky expedition in the turbulence anymore. Where is my island of safety? Where is my oasis of love? Where is the shoulder of perpetual peace on which my empty spirit can rest?